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IS NATIONAL SECURITY A THREAT TO TIKTOK?
HOW THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW
MODERNIZATION ACT THREATENS TECH COMPANIES

Samuel List*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2017, Beijing ByteDance Technologies
(“ByteDance”), a Chinese technology company, purchased the
Chinese social media application Musical.ly for $1 billion. 1 At
the time of its purchase, Musical.ly was an immensely popular
application among teenagers with approximately sixty million
users across the United States and Europe. 2 Musical.ly allowed
users to post short-form, karaoke-styled videos on the
application’s platform, collaborate with other users, and share
their creations with friends. 3
After purchasing Musical.ly, ByteDance released a statement
assuring its users that Musical.ly would remain a distinct entity in
its vast portfolio of digital applications. 4 A year after closing the
Musical.ly purchase, however, ByteDance was unfaithful to its
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1
Greg Roumeliotis, Yingzhi Yang, Echo Wang & Alexandra Alper, Exclusive:
U.S. Opens National Security Investigation into TikTok, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opensnational-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL.
2
Paul Mozur, Musical.ly, a Chinese App Big in the U.S., Sells for $1 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/business/
dealbook/musically-sold-app-video.html.
3

Id.

Jack Nicas, Mike Isaac & Ana Swanson, TikTok Said to Be Under National
Security Review, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/
4

technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html?searchResultPosition=22.
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word and merged Musical.ly’s platform with ByteDance’s family
of similar applications creating what has become one of the
world’s fastest growing and most popular forms of social media:
TikTok. 5 Almost immediately, TikTok reached unprecedented
levels of popularity, boasting 750 million downloads in just its
first twelve months.6
In the fall of 2019, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (“CFIUS,” or “Committee”), a U.S. regulatory
body tasked with reviewing foreign transactions for potential
national security risks, opened an investigation into the
acquisition, citing concerns over ByteDance’s potential access to
TikTok users’ data. 7 Specifically, U.S. government officials were
concerned that the Chinese government could access TikTok
users’ data through the exercise of a 2017 national intelligence
law, which required Chinese companies to comply with
intelligence gathering operations. 8 Although ByteDance and
Musical.ly were both Chinese companies and ByteDance’s
acquisition of Musical.ly occurred two years prior the
commencement of the investigations, CFIUS had broad
jurisdiction to scrutinize the transaction under the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”). 9
At the conclusion of its investigation, CFIUS submitted its
recommendations to former President Donald Trump who then
ordered ByteDance to divest its interest in TikTok’s U.S.
operations in the name of national security. 10
This comment argues that in passing FIRRMA, Congress
delegated unprecedented power to the executive branch to
regulate foreign commerce. Although FIRRMA provided CFIUS
with the tools to investigate modern national security threats,
Congress failed to include sufficient checks and balances, which
5
6

Id. (describing TikTok as “a global cultural phenomenon”).
See id. (stating that TikTok was downloaded more than Facebook, Instagram,

YouTube, and Snapchat over the first twelve months after its creation).
7 Roumeliotis, Yang, Wang & Alper, supra note 1.
8 Nicas, Isaac & Swanson, supra note 4.
9 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115232, §§ 1701−28, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565).
10
See Nicole Sperling, Trump Officially Orders TikTok’s Chinese Owner to
Divest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/business/
tiktok-trump-bytedance-order.html.
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has allowed the executive branch to weaponize national security
interests for political gain. In order to provide foreign investors
with confidence in CFIUS’s review process and to prevent
executive abuse of delegated foreign commerce power, this
comment suggests that Congress should make specific
amendments to FIRRMA that will both increase CFIUS’s
transparency and hold the executive branch accountable for
misusing foreign investment regulation.
Part II gives a history of CFIUS, how it was created, and how
Congress has modified it under the Exon-Florio Provision, the
Byrd Amendment, and the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007. Part III of this comment introduces the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018,
discusses how CFIUS’s jurisdiction has expanded under
FIRRMA, and analyzes FIRRMA’s key procedural changes. Part
IV illustrates the implications of CFIUS’s expanded jurisdiction
under FIRRMA by exploring CFIUS’s recent investigations into
seemingly innocuous technology companies. Lastly, Part V
proposes solutions that will integrate checks and balances
proportional to CFIUS’s expanded jurisdiction under FIRRMA,
which will increase the transparency of foreign investment
regulation and prevent the executive branch from abusing
CFIUS’s powers.
II.

CFIUS’S BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Part II discusses the history of the CFIUS. In discussing
CFIUS’s origins, this Part explains Congress’ role in expanding
CFIUS’s review power through the following legislation: the
Exon-Florio Provision, the Byrd Amendment, and the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007.
A. CFIUS’s Origin
President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 11858 on
May 7, 1975, establishing CFIUS. 11 At its genesis, CFIUS was an
interagency committee contained within the Treasury
11
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS), 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2020)
[hereinafter JACKSON, CFIUS].
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Department. 12 The Executive Order appointed the Secretary of
the Treasury as the chair of CFIUS and directed the Secretary of
Commerce to participate in CFIUS’s review of foreign
investment. 13
The Ford Administration’s primary goal in establishing
CFIUS was to create a committee that would review foreign
investments for potential national security risks.14 President
Ford’s executive order tasked CFIUS with monitoring foreign
investments and communicating with parties engaged in such
transactions. 15
Specifically, CFIUS’s creation was the Ford
Administration’s reaction to “growing concerns over the rapid
increase in investments by Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries in American portfolio
assets (Treasury securities, corporate stocks and bonds), and to
12

See id.

Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975). Specifically, the Secretary
of Commerce was tasked with:
(1) [o]btaining, consolidating, and analyzing information on
foreign investment in the United States; (2) Improving the
procedures for the collection and dissemination of information
on such foreign investment; (3) Observing foreign investment in
the United States; (4) Preparing reports and analyses of trends
and of significant developments in appropriate categories of such
investment; (5) Compiling data and preparing evaluation of
significant transactions; and (6) Submitting to the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States appropriate reports,
analyses, data, and recommendations as to how information on
foreign investment can be kept current.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 5–6.
14
See Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990 (1975) (establishing the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States); see also JACKSON, CFIUS,
supra note 11, at 4−5.
15
Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 900 (1975). The Executive Order
included CFIUS’s primary objectives:
(1) arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and
significant developments in foreign investment in the United
States; (2) provide guidance on arrangements with foreign
governments for advance consultations on prospective major
foreign governmental investment in the United States; (3) review
investment in the United States which, in the judgment of the
Committee, might have major implications for U.S. national
interests; and (4) consider proposals for new legislation or
regulations relating to foreign investment as may appear
necessary.
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 5.
13
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respond to [congressional] concerns . . . that much of the OPEC
investments were being driven by political, rather than economic
motive.” 16
Because CFIUS dealt with issues that touched both national
security and sensitive business investments, the Ford
Administration recognized that the Committee’s investigative
operations required complete confidentiality and secrecy. 17 To
ensure foreign investors that the new review process was strictly
for the purpose of protecting national security, President Ford
articulated in Executive Order 11858 that all investment-related
information submitted to CFIUS “shall not be publicly disclosed”
and that CFIUS would use the provided information “for the
purpose of carrying out the functions and activities” prescribed
by the Order.18 The secrecy that President Ford promised to
foreign investors in 1975 still cloaks CFIUS today, creating
tension between CFIUS’s original national security objective and
the potential abuse of CFIUS’s powers.19
Being a creature of the executive branch that operates in the
foreign commerce space, CFIUS’s legal authority was
immediately questioned. 20 First, CFIUS lacked the constitutional
authority to block transactions posing national security concerns;
under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the express
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” 21 CFIUS,
having its roots under Article II, did not have the constitutional
authority to regulate foreign commerce without congressional
delegation.
Another legal hurdle that CFIUS faced in its infancy was
whether the Committee had the power to demand sensitive
business information from transacting parties. Many government
officials had concerns that the federal agency members
comprising CFIUS’s structure were without legal authority to

JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 4.
See Kevin Granville, CFIUS, Powerful and Unseen, is a Gatekeeper on Major
Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/
business/what-is-cfius.html.
18 Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990 (1971–1975).
19 See Granville, supra note 17; see also discussion infra Parts III.A.1–2.
20 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
16
17
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collect sensitive business information.22 To address concerns over
the ambiguous, legal authority vested in CFIUS by the President,
Congress passed and President Ford signed into law the
International Investment Survey Act of 1976 (“IISA”). 23 The IISA
gave the President “‘clear and unambiguous authority’ to collect
information on ‘international investment.’” 24
After settling legal authority concerns, Congress once again
began to question CFIUS, but this time over the Committee’s
underutilization. 25 Congress complained that CFIUS convened
infrequently after having met approximately twice a year from
1975 to 1980.26 CFIUS responded to Congress’ concerns by
increasing its investigations and fielding requests from executive
agencies taking issue with certain foreign investments. 27 The
Department of Defense soon became CFIUS’s favorite customer,
submitting the most review requests with the Committee between
1980 and 1987. 28 Specifically, the Department of Defense
requested CFIUS to focus its investigations on investments from
Japan—a prominent competitor of the United States at the
time—in U.S. corporations that were critical to the production of
military weaponry. 29
Concerned with Japanese businesses
targeting American national defense industries, Congress sought
to improve CFIUS by broadening its investigative discretion and
expanding its capabilities to scrutinize foreign investment. 30
B. The Exon-Florio Provision
To expand CFIUS’s authority to meet the concerns relating
to Japanese acquisitions of U.S. defense firms, Congress passed
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
24 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
25 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
26 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
27 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
28
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that transaction review
requests were made mostly by the Department of Defense).
29
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6 (specifying CFIUS’s concerns from
increased Japanese investment in a U.S. steel producer and U.S. firms that
manufactured “specialized ball bearings for the military”).
30
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 7 (reiterating that Congress was
mainly concerned with Japanese investments).
22
23
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the Exon-Florio Provision as part of the Defense Production Act
of 1988 (“Exon-Florio”). 31
Exon-Florio expanded CFIUS’s
jurisdiction by lowering the threshold for executive action and
granting the President increased discretion when determining
whether a transaction posed a threat to national security. 32
Specifically, Exon-Florio granted the President the power to
block “proposed or pending foreign ‘mergers, acquisitions, or
takeovers’ of ‘persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States’ that threaten to impair the national security.” 33
Prior to Exon-Florio, the President could only suspend or
prohibit foreign investment after a national emergency was
declared. 34
Thus, Exon-Florio streamlined the President’s
authority to act without having to meet the high burden of
declaring a national emergency. 35
Critically, Exon-Florio expanded the President’s discretion
by not expressly defining “national security.” 36 Instead, ExonFlorio provided several factors that the President was to consider
in determining whether a foreign transaction presented a
national security risk. 37 The President, however, could weigh
each factor differently, which granted the executive broad
discretion in determining what constitutes a threat to national
security.38
While Exon-Florio increased the scope of the President’s
judgment, Congress placed conditions on its exercise.
Specifically, Exon-Florio required that before blocking a
transaction, the President must “conclude[] that (1) other U.S.
laws were inadequate or inappropriate to protect the national
31
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22863, FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
CFIUS, AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 1, (2011) [hereinafter JACKSON,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT OVERVIEW].
32 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 7.
33 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 7.
34
50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (limiting the President’s power to declare a national
emergency in response to an “unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national
security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”).
35
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining that the President was
required to declare a national emergency before stopping the foreign takeover of
U.S. firms).
36 JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2.
37 JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2.
38 JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2.
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security; and (2) ‘credible evidence’ existed that the foreign
interest exercising control might take action that threatened to
impair U.S. national security.” 39 This two-prong standard was
carried over in the Foreign Investment and National Security Act
of 2007 and is still in place under FIRRMA today. 40
The Exon-Florio Provision marked CFIUS’s first major
transformation. As its lasting legacy, Exon-Florio transformed
CFIUS “from an administrative body with limited authority . . . to
an important component of U.S. foreign investment policy with a
broad mandate, and significant authority to advise the President
on foreign investment transactions and to recommend that some
transactions be suspended or blocked.” 41 Although CFIUS’s
power reached new heights under Exon-Florio, it was still seldom
exercised. Between 1988 and 1999, of the nearly 1,300 foreign
acquisitions reported to CFIUS by transacting parties, the
Committee
investigated
only
seventeen
transactions. 42
Investigating less than two percent of such transactions over an
eleven year period was likely the result of CFIUS itself having
limited discretion to investigate sua sponte. 43 As an executive
committee that “operates under the authority of the President,”
CFIUS investigations were constrained to transactions that
“reflect[ed the President’s] attitudes and policies.” 44
C. The Byrd Amendment: Shifting Power Back to Congress
In 1992, Congress amended Exon-Florio through the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (“Byrd
Amendment”). 45 The Byrd Amendment was Congress’ hastened
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 7.
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 7.
41 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8.
42
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-00-144, DEFENSE TRADE:
IDENTIFYING FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY CAN BE
IMPROVED 7–8 (2000).
43 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8.
44 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8.
45
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-484, §§ 837(a)–(b), 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–64. The provision of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 that amended CFIUS is commonly
referred to as the “Byrd Amendment” because Senator Robert Byrd sponsored it.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 9.
39
40
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response to a French government-owned corporation’s attempt
to acquire the missile division of an American conglomerate that
was in a contractual relationship with the U.S. Department of
Defense at the time. 46 Although the French government-owned
corporation withdrew its bid, the attempted acquisition made
clear that Exon-Florio needed an update to address future
situations where foreign governments attempt to acquire sensitive
U.S. technology by acquiring U.S. defense firms. 47 The Byrd
Amendment made two profound changes to CFIUS’s review
process. First, the Byrd Amendment required CFIUS to review
transactions involving foreign governments.48 Second, the Byrd
Amendment increased the President’s burden to provide detailed
reports to Congress regarding CFIUS’s investigations. 49
Turning to the first major change, the Byrd Amendment
established a two-part test that mandated CFIUS to investigate
proposed and pending mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
where: “(1) the acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government; and (2) the acquisition results in control of a
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that
could affect the national security of the United States.” 50 Prior to
the Byrd Amendment, the President had “discretion to avoid
investigating proposed foreign takeovers.” 51 CFIUS’s review
power was under the President’s complete control and was
primarily invoked to investigate transactions that aligned with the
President’s policies and objectives.52 Post-Byrd Amendment,
46
W. Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation
Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1763–64 (1993) (discussing Thomson-

CSF’s proposed acquisition of LTV Corporation’s aerospace and defense business).
47
See Christopher R. Fenton, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 206 (2002) (indicating that Congress was motivated to amend
Exon-Florio by Thomson-CSF’s proposed acquisition of LTV Corporation’s missile
division).
48
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 §§ 837(a)–(b),
106 Stat. at 2463–64.
49
See Fenton, supra note 47, at 209 (discussing changes to CFIUS procedures
under the Byrd Amendment).
50 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 9.
51
Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Control on Foreign
Investment and Operations: How Much Is Enough?, 9 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 417,
429 (1994).
52

See id.
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however, when a transaction met the conditions of the Byrd
Amendment’s two-part test, CFIUS was mandated to conduct a
compulsory investigation, preventing the executive committee
from remaining obedient to the “attitudes and polices” of the
President. 53 Stated differently, even when the President did not
want a particular transaction reviewed for political reasons,
CFIUS was required to investigate.54 Through passage of the
Byrd Amendment, Congress restricted the President’s discretion
to review foreign transactions and regained foreign commerce
power it previously delegated to the executive branch. 55
The second significant change made under the Byrd
Amendment was increasing the President’s obligation to provide
Congress with reports on the state of foreign investment
regulation. 56 Under the Byrd Amendment, the President was to
“immediately transmit . . . a written report” to Congress with the
“President’s determination of whether or not to take action”
following CFIUS’s investigation.57
The Byrd Amendment
instructed the President to include within the report a
description of the investigation’s findings as well as the factors
weighed in determining whether to take action. 58 Pre-Byrd
Amendment, the President was only required to provide a report
to Congress if a transaction was prohibited.59 Therefore, to
ensure greater oversight of CFIUS, the Byrd Amendment
required the President to provide a report to Congress regardless
of whether the transaction was ultimately prohibited.60
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8; see also Corr, supra note 51, at 429–30.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8; see also Corr, supra note 51,
at 429–30 (explaining that CFIUS was required to review certain transactions
irrespective of the President’s personal opinion).
55 See Corr, supra note 51, at 429–30.
56
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-484, § 837(c), 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–64 (1992); see also Fenton, supra note
47, at 209.
57
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(c), 106 Stat.
at 2463–64; see also Fenton, supra note 47, at 209.
58
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(c), 106 Stat.
at 2463–64.
59 See Fenton, supra note 47, at 209.
60 U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-686, DEFENSE TRADE:
ENHANCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE
LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2005); see also National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(c), 106 Stat. 2463–64.
53
54

LIST (DO NOT DELETE)

3/1/2022 9:14 AM

COMMENT

2022]

183

Unlike prior modifications made to CFIUS, the reporting
obligations included in the Byrd Amendment represented
Congress’ ability to introduce mechanisms of accountability. The
Byrd Amendment “sen[t] a clear message to CFIUS that
Congress will carefully review” CFIUS’s investigations. 61 By
increasing CFIUS’s reporting requirements, Congress could
“exert political pressure for more rigorous, stricter enforcement”
of the federal foreign investment review process. 62
D. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of

2007

The third and final amendment to CFIUS prior to FIRRMA
took effect on July 26, 2007, when President George W. Bush
signed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
(“FINSA”) into law. 63 FINSA represented congressional concerns
that CFIUS’s review jurisdiction was inadequate to address the
evolving national security threats facing the United States.
Specifically, Congress was motivated to expand CFIUS’s
authority in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the Dubai Ports World controversy, and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation’s bid to purchase the U.S. energy
producer Unocal Corporation. 64
The following section will examine FINSA, its legislative
goals, and how it affected CFIUS’s structure. Then, this section
will conclude by discussing CFIUS’s review procedures under
FINSA.
61
62
63

See Corr, supra note 51, at 430.
See Corr, supra note 51, at 430–31.
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-

49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170); JAMES K.
JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY:
ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS
16,
16
n.44
(2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34561.pdf
[hereinafter
JACKSON, ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS].
64
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 4 (indicating that the Dubai Ports World
“transaction revealed that the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks fundamentally
altered the viewpoint of some Members of Congress regarding the role of foreign
investment in the economy”); David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification
Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 95 (2009) (explaining that the Dubai Ports World
transaction and China National Offshore Oil Company for Unocal Corporation
motivated Congress to alter CFIUS’s jurisdiction).
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1. Legitimizing CFIUS
Unlike Exon-Florio and the Byrd Amendment, FINSA
delegated the power to take investigatory action directly to
CFIUS. 65 Under FINSA, CFIUS is expressly authorized to “take
any necessary actions in connection with the transaction to
protect the national security of the United States.” 66 It is
important to note that prior to FINSA, CFIUS’s powers were
never truly codified.67 As mentioned previously, CFIUS was
originally created by executive order and not through Congress’
foreign commerce powers.68
The Exon-Florio and Byrd
Amendments were Congress’ attempt to regulate and control
President Ford’s creation. 69 Neither Exon-Florio nor the Byrd
Amendment, however, brought CFIUS’s powers under a statutory
framework. 70 Thus, FINSA represented Congress’ express desire
to legitimize CFIUS in the eyes of the law to assure foreign
investors that CFIUS was a stable, foreign investment regulatory
body.71
2. FINSA Expanded the Definition of “Covered
Transactions”
In addition to legitimatizing CFIUS, regulations set forth by
the Department of Treasury provided much-needed clarity to
foreign investors by defining the transactions that were subject to
CFIUS investigations. FINSA retained Exon-Florio’s definition
of “covered transactions,” which included “any merger,
acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any foreign person which
could result in foreign control of any person engaged in

65
66
67
68

at 4–5
69
70

See Foreign Investment and National Security Act § 2(b)(2), 121 Stat. at 248.
Id.
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 10.
See discussion supra Part II.A.; see also JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11,
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 6.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 10 (pointing out that FINSA gives

CFIUS statutory authority).
71
See Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security

Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of
Globalization, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 234 (2012) (indicating that CFIUS’s
framework under FINSA reinforced the United States’ open investment policy).
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interstate commerce in the United States.” 72 Although FINSA did
explicitly define the term “control,” the FINSA regulations
provided a broad and functional definition that focused on
“power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether
or not exercised or exercisable.” 73
The Treasury’s broad
definition of “control” expanded CFIUS’s jurisdiction to
investigate not only mergers and acquisitions, but voting interest
gained by foreign entities through stock purchases, such as “the
acquisition of stock interests with voting rights, forming a joint
venture, and the conversion of convertible voting securities.” 74
Most importantly, FINSA granted CFIUS the power to
initiate retroactive reviews of any covered transaction sua
sponte. 75 Although parties to a covered transaction retained the
ability to initiate a formal CFIUS review by providing written
notice to CFIUS, FINSA granted CFIUS independent power to
review any covered transaction, even if the parties did not
voluntarily notify CFIUS or after the transaction had already
been closed. 76
3. CFIUS’s Composition Under FINSA
FINSA was also significant because it codified CFIUS’s
membership structure. 77
FINSA retained CFIUS’s existing
membership with the Secretary of the Treasury as the
chairperson of the Committee and the heads of the Departments
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
§ 2(a)(3), 121 Stat. 246, 246.
73
Id. at § 2(a)(2), 121 Stat. at 247; See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS)
17 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33388/68 [hereinafter
JACKSON, 2018 CFIUS REPORT].
74
Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli, National Security or Xenophobia: The
72

Impact of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”) in Foreign
Investment in the U.S., 2 WM. MITCHELL L. RAZA. J. 1, 26 (2011); see also JACKSON,
2018 CFIUS REPORT, supra note 73, at 15 (indicating that certain transactions not

considered to be covered transactions under FINSA were not subject to CFIUS
review).
75
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2(b)(1)(D), 121
Stat. at 248 (establishing CFIUS’s power to initiate a unilateral review of covered
transactions).
76 See Zaring, supra note 64, at 96.
77
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 10 (indicating that FINSA made
CFIUS membership permanent).
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of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Justice, and
Energy as permanent members, with the Department of Energy
being the only new permanent member.78 By codifying the
structure of CFIUS, Congress “stabilized the entire process by
firmly establishing the membership of CFIUS, preventing the
President from shifting members in and out of CFIUS or from
eliminating it completely.” 79
4. FINSA Codified CFIUS’s Review Procedures
Under FINSA, parties to a covered transaction did “not have
an affirmative legal requirement to notify CFIUS.” 80 Instead, the
voluntary notification system provided a strategic tool for the
parties to a covered transaction to avoid potential retroactive
CFIUS review that could reverse a closed transaction. 81 Although
FINSA does not include a statute of limitations, parties could
strategically achieve “protect[ion] from future CFIUS
interference” if, after filing voluntary notice, CFIUS cleared the
transaction. 82
Turning to CFIUS’s investigation procedures, FINSA
codified CFIUS’s three-level national security screening process. 83
The first level required CFIUS to determine a foreign
transaction’s risk to national security by conducting a National
Security Review. 84 FINSA limited the initial National Security
Review to a maximum of thirty days, beginning on the day that

78
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 22. The Secretary of Labor and the
Director of National Intelligence hold nonvoting, ex officio member status, with
their roles defined by statute and regulation. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(k)(2)(H)–(J).
79
Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much
Congressional Involvement is too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 351 (2007).
80 Christopher Kimball & Kevin King, M&A Guide to CFIUS: How the Review
Process Can Impact Your Transaction, COOLEY (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2017/2017-10-06-ma-guide-to-cfius-article-1of-4.
81 See id. (advising parties to a covered transaction to weigh the costs associated
with voluntarily filing with CFIUS against the benefit of being protected from
future CFIUS investigation).
82

See id.

Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
§§ 2–6, 121 Stat. 246, 256.
84 Id. at § 2, 121 Stat. at 248.
83
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the Committee accepted written notice from transacting parties. 85
During the initial thirty-day review period, CFIUS considered the
following eleven factors when determining whether a particular
transaction presents national security risks:
(1) domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements;
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic
industries to meet national defense requirements,
including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, materials, and other supplies
and services;
(3) the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects
the capability and capacity of the United States to
meet the requirements of national security;
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment,
or technology to [certain] countr[ies] . . .;
(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on United States international
technological leadership in areas affecting United
States national security;
(6) the potential national security-related effects on
United States critical infrastructure, including
major energy assets;
(7) the potential national security-related effects on
United States critical technologies;
(8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign
government-controlled transaction;
(9) a review of the current assessment of [the
foreign country’s relationship and cooperation with
the United States];
(10) the long-term projection of United States
requirements for sources of energy and other
critical resources and material; and
(11) such other factors as the President or [CFIUS]
85

Id.
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may determine to be appropriate, generally or in
connection with a specific review or investigation. 86
If CFIUS determined during the initial thirty-day review that
a transaction posed a national security risk, CFIUS was required
to initiate the second level of review, which consists of a forty-five
day National Security Investigation carried out by the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI). 87
During the forty-five day
investigation period, the DNI was required to “expeditiously
carry out a thorough analysis of any threat to the national
security of the United States” and provide CFIUS with relevant
information gathered by the national intelligence community. 88
In addition, CFIUS could use this information to identify and
facilitate mitigation measures necessary to cleanse the transaction
and receive approval. 89 At the conclusion of the forty-five day
period, if the national security concerns were not mitigated,
CFIUS could either: (1) “take any necessary actions in connection
with the transaction to protect the national security of the United
States,” 90 or (2) refer the transaction to the President with
recommendations to either approve, reject, or impose mitigation
measures on the transacting parties.91
The final level of CFIUS’s review process under FINSA gave
the President fifteen days to make a decision based on the
Committee’s recommendations. 92
Although FINSA granted
CFIUS the power to investigate and to make recommendations to
the President, Congress placed no obligation on the President “to
follow the recommendation of the Committee.” 93 Rather, under
FINSA, the President had discretion to make a decision
irrespective of the Committee’s findings and recommendations. 94
86
87
88
89

Id. at § 4, 121 Stat. at 248.
See id. at § 2(b)(4), 121 Stat. at 251.
See id.
See Kimball & King, supra note 80.

90
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
§ 2, 121 Stat. 246, 248.
91 31 C.F.R. § 800.508(b); see also Kimball & King, supra note 80.
92
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 6, 121 Stat. at 255–
56.
93 See JACKSON, 2018 CFIUS REPORT, supra note 73, at 13.
94
See JACKSON, 2018 CFIUS REPORT, supra note 73, at 13 (“[T]he President is
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If the President ultimately decided to block a transaction, FINSA
required the President to follow the two-part set forth under
Exon-Florio: (1) conclude that “other U.S. laws are inadequate or
inappropriate to protect the national security;” and (2) have
“credible evidence” that the foreign interest will impair the
national security. 95 After satisfying these two conditions, the
President could take “such action for such time as the President
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered
transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the
United States.” 96
III.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 2018

The decade following FINSA revealed critical gaps in
CFIUS’s jurisdiction to investigate modern foreign investment
trends. 97
For example, foreign investment in the 2010s
introduced an increased presence of foreign sovereign control
over investments made in the United States, complex fund
structures, and the potential for foreign countries to exploit the
personal identifiable data of American citizens. 98 CFIUS was
simply not equipped to investigate these developments in
investment strategy under FINSA’s outdated framework. 99
To ensure that CFIUS had the resources and authority to
review novel trends in foreign investment, on August 13, 2018,
former President Donald Trump signed into law the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
(“FIRRMA”). 100 House congressional leaders praised the final
granted almost unlimited authority to take ‘such action for such time as the
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”).
95
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 9, 121 Stat. at 255–
56; see JACKSON, 2018 CFIUS REPORT, supra note 73, at 5; see also discussion supra
Part II.B.
96
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 9, 121 Stat.
at 255.
97 Heath P. Tarbert, Modernizing CFIUS, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 1477, 1492–
93 (2020).
98 Id. at 1493.
99

Id.

Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, §§ 1701-28, 132 Stat. 2173 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565).
100
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FIRRMA billed signed by the former President as “a strong . . .
bill, which helps protect our Nation’s security” and a “bipartisan,
bicameral product that reflects the work and views of . . . experts”
in the fields of defense, intelligence, and business.101 FIRRMA
represents the most expansive amendment to CFIUS’s foreign
investment review jurisdiction since the Committee was formed
in 1975. 102 In passing FIRRMA, Congress recognized that the
landscape of foreign investment and national security had shifted
during the decade following FINSA and that CFIUS’s review
powers were in serious need of an upgrade. 103 The following
sections outline the relevant changes FIRRMA makes to foreign
investment regulation in the United States.
A. More Transactions Fall Under CFIUS’s Jurisdiction
FIRRMA was specifically enacted to modernize CFIUS after
members of Congress expressed concerns over an influx of
Chinese investment in United States technology firms and
Chinese investment schemes that took advantage of loopholes to
evade CFIUS’s review. 104
Congress expanded CFIUS’s
jurisdiction for the first time to include foreign investment in
U.S. businesses that do not convey a controlling equity interest,
which in effect, gives CFIUS the authority to investigate passive
investments.105
Specifically, FIRRMA expands CFIUS’s
investigatory jurisdiction to include any non-controlling
investment in the following three areas: critical technologies,
critical infrastructure, and sensitive personal data. 106
Most
101
164 CONG. REC. H7700 (daily ed. July 26, 2018) (statement by Rep. Mac
Thornberry); 164 CONG. REC. H7704 (daily ed. July 26, 2018) (statement by Rep.
Andy Barr).
102
J. Russell Blakey, The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act:
The Doubled Edged Sword of U.S. Foreign Investment Regulations, 53 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 981, 998–99 (2020) (arguing that FIRRMA is “the most revolutionizing
expansion of CFIUS’s reviewing power and jurisdiction”).
103
Jeffrey Bialos & Mark Herlach, How FIRRMA Will Change National
Security Review: Part 1, LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2018, 3:14 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1073822/how-firrma-will-change-national-securityreviews-part-1.
104 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 11.
105 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 19–23.
106
50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(A) (critical technologies); 50 U.S.C § 4565(a)(5)
(critical infrastructure); 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B) (sensitive personal data).
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pertinent to this comment is CFIUS’s jurisdictional expansion
into transactions that involve personal user data. FIRRMA gives
CFIUS the authority to investigate investments, whether passive
or non-passive, that afford a foreign person access to sensitive
personal data of U.S. citizens.107
Thus, FIRRMA’s expansion of CFIUS’s jurisdiction is
significant for two reasons. First, transactions are now subject to
CFIUS review into whether a foreign person has “control” over a
U.S. business.
Second, many, if not all, U.S. technology
companies collect personally identifiable information of U.S.
citizens, making almost all foreign investment in U.S. technology
firms subject to CFIUS’s jurisdiction.
1. Passive Investments
Expanding transactions covered by CFIUS to include
passive, non-controlling investments is a significant grant of
power. Prior to FIRRMA, truly passive investments were never
subject to CFIUS review. 108 A passive investment by a foreign
individual is “any investment that gives the foreign investor no de
jure or de facto capacity to control, direct, or decide any matters
of the U.S. business.” 109 To illustrate, a foreign person’s purchase
of a relatively small block of stock in a U.S. business on the open
market would be considered a passive investment; the foreign
individual invests seeking a financial return without acquiring
any meaningful control over the U.S. business.110
Stated
differently, the phrase “passive investment” alludes to the idea
that the investment is strictly for the purpose of financial gain
and not for purposes such as gaining a seat on the board of
directors, or taken to the extreme, to undermine the national
security of the United States.
In contrast to a passive investment, a non-passive investment
is the acquisition or holding of ownership interests in a U.S.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 11.
Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an
Open Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 43 (2018) (explaining that passive investments were
107
108

exempt from CFIUS’s jurisdiction prior to FIRRMA).
109 Id. at 42.
110

Id.
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company with the intent to exercise control over that company. 111
Under FIRRMA, in addition to having the requisite intent to
control a U.S. business, to qualify as a non-passive investment,
the interest holder must also either: (i) acquire “any rights that if
exercised would constitute control” over the investment; (ii)
acquire “any access rights, or involvement in” any covered
investment; and (iii) take “action inconsistent with holding or
acquiring such interests solely for the purpose of passive
investment.” 112 An example of a non-passive investment would be
a foreign person acquiring a majority voting interest in a U.S.
business and then later negotiating the right to appoint a
member to the board of directors.113 In this example, because the
foreign person invested with the requisite intent and then actively
engaged in asserting control over the U.S. business through the
appointment of a director, the foreign investor’s acquisition of
the U.S. business’ voting interest would not be characterized as
“solely for the purpose of passive investment.” 114
2. Personally Identifiable Data of U.S. Citizens
Although Congress did not include a definition for “sensitive
personal data” in FIRRMA’s statutory language, regulations set
forth by the Department of the Treasury provide a detailed
definition and examples of identifiable data that, if exploited,
have the potential to threaten national security. 115 Under
FIRRMA regulations, sensitive personal data includes
“identifiable data that is maintained or collected by” U.S.
businesses that: (1) “target or tailor” products or services to
certain U.S. government agencies and personnel; (2) maintain or
collect
“any
identifiable
data . . . on greater than one million individuals;” or (3) have “a
demonstrated business objective to maintain or collect any
identifiable data . . . on greater than one million individuals and
such data is an integrated part of the U.S. business’s primary

111
112
113
114
115

See 31 C.F.R. § 800.243(a).
Id.
See id. § 800.243(b).
Id. § 800.243(a).
Id. § 800.241(a)(1)(i)(A)–(C).
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products or services.” 116 The FIRRMA regulations also list the
following ten categories of data maintained or collected by U.S.
businesses that may pose a risk to national security: financial
data; data in a consumer report; health insurance application
data; data relating to the physical, mental, or psychological
health of an individual; private communications between end
users of a product or service; geolocation data; biometric data;
data used for state and federal government identification cards;
data concerning security clearances; and data included in security
clearance applications. 117
B. Procedural Changes to CFIUS Under FIRRMA
In addition to expanding CFIUS’s substantive powers,
FIRRMA also made significant procedural changes to CFIUS’s
investigative process. This section discusses two significant
procedural changes made under FIRRMA: mandatory filings and
a lengthened review period.
1. Mandatory
Filings
Transactions

for

Certain

Covered

FIRRMA addresses an issue that has plagued CFIUS since its
creation—what to do when a transaction falls under its
jurisdiction but is not reported to the Committee. 118 Prior to
FIRRMA, CFIUS was constrained by limited resources and
transacting parties did not have a legal duty to file notice with the
Committee. 119
In many cases, the transacting parties that
provided CFIUS with notice only did so for strategic purposes
and not because the law required them to do so. 120 As a result,
many transactions that fell under CFIUS’s jurisdiction were not
reviewed simply because CFIUS did not have the means to
monitor and identify all such activity. 121
116

Id.

31 C.F.R § 800.241(a)(1)(ii)(A)–(J).
COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANN. REPORT TO CONG. 37 (2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY2018.pdf (discussing transactions that are were not reported to CFIUS).
119 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 12.
120 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 8–9.
121 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-249, COMM. ON FOREIGN INV.
117
118
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To address congressional concerns that predatory foreign
investments occurring in plain sight yet beyond CFIUS’s reach,
Congress shifted the filing process from a voluntary system to a
mandatory requirement in certain cases. 122 FIRRMA mandates
foreign investors to file declarations with CFIUS for two types of
transactions: (1) when a foreign national or foreign government
acquires a “substantial interest” in a U.S. business; and (2) when a
foreign national or government invests in a U.S. business that
develops “critical technologies.” 123
To enforce FIRRMA’s
mandatory filing requirements, Congress granted CFIUS the
power to impose monetary penalties. 124
Under the “substantial interest” prong, CFIUS mandates
notification of transactions “by a foreign person in which a
foreign government, directly or indirectly, [has a] substantial
interest.” 125 It is important to note that a “foreign person,” as
defined by the FIRRMA regulations, is “[a]ny foreign national,
foreign government, or foreign entity” or any entity that can be
controlled by any foreign national, government, or entity. 126
FIRRMA defines “substantial interest” in the negative, stating
that an investment or acquisition that results in “less than a [ten
percent] voting interest” is “not considered a substantial
interest.” 127 To rephrase FIRRMA’s definition, any investment or
acquisition that results in the foreign control of a ten percent
voting interest will trigger CFIUS’s “substantial interest” prong.128
In addition to triggering mandatory filings under the
“substantial interest” prong, mandatory declarations are required
under FIRRMA when a foreign person invests “in certain U.S.
businesses that produce, design test, manufacture, fabricate, or
develop one or more critical technologies in [twenty-eight]
IN THE U.S.: TREASURY SHOULD COORDINATE
INCREASED WORKLOAD 19–20 (2018).
122
123

RESOURCES NEEDED

JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 50.
See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 50.

TO

ADDRESS

50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(gg); 31 C.F.R. § 800.901(a).
50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(bb)(AA); 31 C.F.R § 800.244(a) (defining
“substantial interest” as an acquisition of a 25% or more voting interest in a U.S.
business by a foreign person, or 49% or more voting interest in a U.S. business by a
foreign government in a foreign person).
126 31 C.F.R. § 800.224(a).
127 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(bb)(BB) (defining “substantial interest”).
124
125

128

See id.
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specified activities.” 129 Requiring mandatory filings for foreign
investment in critical technologies is a significant procedural
change simply because it increases the number of filings that
CFIUS must sift through, further straining the resources of the
relatively small executive branch committee. 130 It is likely that
increasing the number of cases on CFIUS’s docket is that it will
disincentivize CFIUS to conduct thorough investigations in order
to quickly clear as many transactions as possible, which is in
friction with FIRRMA’s express purpose of protecting the
national security of the United States.
2. Expanded Duration of Review
The second significant procedural change under FIRRMA is
the expanded duration of CFIUS’s review process. FIRRMA
mostly retained FINSA’s three-level national security screening
129 See JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 16; 31 C.F.R. § 800 app. A. (stating
that the twenty-eight activities are: (1) Internet protocol or telecommunications
service; (2) Certain internet exchange points; (3) Submarine cable systems; (4)
Submarine cable landing systems; (5) Data center at a submarine landing facility;
(6) Satellite or satellite systems servicing the /Department of Defense; (7) Industrial
resources manufactured or operated for a Major Defense Acquisition Program; (8)
Any industrial resource manufactured pursuant to a “DX” priority rated contract;
(9) Any facility that manufactures certain specialty metals, chemical weapons,
carbon. alloy and steel plates, and other specified materials; (10) Any industrial
resource that had been funded by the Defense Production Act, Industrial Base
Fund, Rapid Innovation Fund, Manufacturing Technology Program, Defense
Logistics Warstopper Program, or the Defense Logistics Agency Surge and
Sustainment Program; (11) Electric energy storage systems; (12) Any electric
storage system linked to the bulk electric system; (13) Electric energy generation,
transmission or distribution for military installations; (14) Any industrial control
system used by bulk-power systems, or a facility directly supporting a military
installation; (15) Certain refineries; (16) Certain crude oil storage facilities; (17)
Certain LNG import or export terminals or certain natural gas underground
storage facilities; (18) Systemically important financial market utilities; (19) Certain
financial market exchanges; (20) Technology providers in the Significant Service
Provider Program; (21) Any rail line designated as part of the DOD Strategic Rail
Corridor Network; (22) Certain interstate oil pipelines; (23) Certain interstate
natural gas pipelines; (24) Any industrial control system utilized by interstate oil or
natural gas pipelines; (25) Certain airports; (26) Certain maritime ports or
terminals; (27) Public water systems; (28) Any industrial control system utilized by
public water systems or treatment works).
130
50 U.S.C. § 4565(p)(3)(B) (allocating to CFIUS $20 million dollars per year
from 2019 through 2023); 50 U.S.C. § 4565(p)(3)(B)(i)(I)(aa), (bb) (permitting
CFIUS to impose filing fees on transacting parties that “may not
exceed . . . 1 percent of the value of the transaction; or $300,000”).
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process. 131 Similar to FINSA, FIRRMA requires CFIUS to
respond to a written declaration within thirty-days. 132 During the
thirty-day period, if CFIUS discovers that the declared
transaction poses national security risks and the risks are not
mitigated, CFIUS may either request the transacting parties to
file a formal written notice with the Committee, or CFIUS may
initiate a unilateral review. 133
The next stage of the review process under FIRRMA is the
National Security Review, which can last up to forty-five days and
is fifteen days longer than it was under FINSA. 134 The National
Security Review can be followed by an additional forty-five-day
National Security Investigation if the risks that CFIUS uncovers
are not resolved during the forty-five-day National Security
Review. 135 The National Security Review can then be extended an
additional fifteen days in “extraordinary circumstances.” 136
Lastly, the final step of CFIUS’s review process remains
unchanged from FINSA, giving the President fifteen days to
make
a
final
determination
based
on
CFIUS’s
137
recommendations.
After aggregating the maximum number of days from the
initial declaration to the President’s final determination, CFIUS’s
review period under FIRRMA for a single transaction has the
potential to last 150 days. 138 The potential 150-day review period
under FIRRMA is significantly longer in comparison to the
ninety-day review period under FINSA. 139
Although CFIUS benefits from an extended review period
because it has more time to conduct a thorough investigation,
U.S. businesses can be harmed by prolonged review periods due
131
132
133
134

See discussion supra Part II.D.4.

50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(III)(bb).

Id. at § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(III)(aa)(BB).
Id. at § 4565(b)(1)(F); see also JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 14–15

(providing an illustrative figure of CFIUS’s review process).
135 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(2)(C)(i); JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 12.
136 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(2)(C)(ii); JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 12.
137 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2).
138 JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 11, at 12–13.
139
The aggregation calculations under FIRRMA and FINSA include the
fifteen-day period the President is granted to act. Compare Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 6, 121 Stat. 246, 255 (2007),
with 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2).
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to associated market risks. For example, in the merger and
acquisition context, if an acquiring-corporation’s stock price
drops during the time between the execution of an agreement
with a target company and the deal’s official closing post-CFIUS
review, the target corporation’s shareholders will receive less
value in return for their shares. Thus, FIRRMA’s longer review
period attaches increased transaction costs for parties conducting
foreign investment due to market risks associated with waiting an
additional two months for CFIUS to complete its review. This
also does not include other regulatory hurdles that foreign
transactions are subject to, which can prolong the closing of deals
even further, leaving the risk of investing in a U.S. business
expensive and difficult to justify. 140
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF CFIUS’S EXPANDED JURISDICTION
UNDER FIRRMA

CFIUS has been described as an iceberg due to a majority of
its investigations into foreign investment occurring “below the
surface” and out of the purview of the general public. 141 While
Congress should be commended for filling many vulnerable gaps
in CFIUS’s regulation framework, FIRRMA failed to include
mechanisms of transparency and accountability that are
proportional to CFIUS’s expanded powers, leaving the
Committee susceptible to executive branch abuse.
More
specifically, FIRRMA leaves CFIUS vulnerable to political abuse
at the hands of the President.
The election of former President Donald Trump, who
infamously ran for office on a platform of economic nationalism
coined as the “America First Movement,” 142 presented the perfect
storm that pushed CFIUS into a politicized position that it was
140
Transactions involving foreign entities and U.S. businesses, in addition to
clearing national security regulations, may also require clearance from other
governmental regulatory hurdles, such as antitrust reviews by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice. See Merger Review, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-review.
141
Emily Birnbaum, ‘This Has Been Botched’: This is What Makes Trump’s
TikTok Tirade So Unusual, PROTOCOL (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/
cfius-tiktok-not-how-this-works (quoting former CFIUS employee).
142
See DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/about (last visited
Oct. 2, 2021).
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never meant to be in. While President Trump advanced his
“America First” economic agenda by renegotiating NAFTA, 143
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 144 and imposing
tariffs on Chinese imports, 145 less conspicuously, the former
President strategically leveraged CFIUS’s expanded authority
under FIRRMA to advance his nationalistic policies. President
Trump’s politicization of CFIUS was and remains problematic
because “there is little law or precedent around what happens
when a President gets personally involved in a CFIUS
decision.” 146
A. Companies That Collect Data, Beware!
To illustrate how FIRRMA has drastically changed foreign
investment regulation in the United States, this section
introduces CFIUS’s unorthodox investigations into Grindr LLC
and TikTok, Inc. These cases demonstrate CFIUS’s novel
authority under FIRRMA to investigate transactions between a
foreign person and a U.S. business that collects and maintains
user data.
1. Grindr—CFIUS’s Ex-Post
Lucrative Dating App

Divestment

of

a

The Trump Administration’s odd mandate to divest Grindr
LLC (“Grindr”) illustrates the delicate balance between the
executive branch’s duty to protect national security and the
potential for the executive branch to abuse CFIUS. Grindr is a
popular dating app among the LGBTQ community and was one
of the first apps specifically tailored for same-sex online dating. 147
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/unitedstates-mexico-canada-agreement (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
144
Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html.
145 See generally Chad P. Brown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline:
An Up-to-Date Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Oct. 31, 2021),
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf.
146 Birnbaum, supra note 141.
147
Jon Shadel, Grindr Was the First Big Dating App for Gay Men. Now It’s
Falling Out of Favor, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
143
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In 2009, technology entrepreneur Joel Simkhai launched Grindr
on Apple’s iOS.148 Like many dating and social media apps at the
time, Grindr’s platform allowed users to post pictures, send
private messages, and update their statuses. 149 Most critical to
Grindr’s success was its use of user geolocation data to facilitate
“spontaneous and intimate” hookups. 150
To create these
connections, the application would locate Grindr users using GPS
and then calculate the distance to other Grindr users in the
area. 151 As a result of successfully integrating geolocation data
into the dating application’s algorithm, Grindr began to court
offers for its platform. 152 Then, in 2016, the Chinese technology
firm Beijing Kunlun Tech Co., Ltd. (“Kunlun”), acquired an
approximate sixty percent interest in Grindr. 153 By 2018, Kunlun
acquired the remaining forty percent interest in Grindr, resulting
in a full buyout. 154
When listing national security concerns that the United
States faces, it is highly unlikely that a popular LGBTQ dating
application would make the list. However, the sale of Grindr to
Kunlun raised concerns within the national security community
because of several well-documented security vulnerabilities

lifestyle/2018/12/06/grindr-was-first-big-dating-app-gay-men-now-its-falling-outfavor. To put Grindr’s popularity into perspective, CFIUS opened an investigation
into Grindr in 2018, the dating app had approximately 3.8 million daily users and
27 million users across the world at the time, making it one of the most active data
apps in the world. See id.
148 Jenna Wortham, How Grindr Is Changing the Way We Connect, N.Y. TIMES
BITS (Mar. 10, 2013, 1:17 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/howgrindr-is-changing-the-way-we-all-connect/; see also Jason Kincaid, Gay Dating
Makes its Way to the iPhone, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 25, 2009),
https://techcrunch.com/2009/03/25/gay-dating-makes-its-way-to-the-iphone.
149
See Wortham, supra note 148 (comparing and contrasting Grindr’s
platform with Facebook and Twitter).
150 Wortham, supra note 148.
151 See Wortham, supra note 148. (describing how Grindr’s platform works).
152 Casey Newton, How Grindr Became a National Security Issue, VERGE (Mar.
28, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/3/28/18285274/grindr
-national-security-cfius-china-kunlun-military.
153
Sarah Bauerle Danzman & Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the U.S. Forcing a
Chinese Company to Sell the Gay Dating App Grindr?, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/why-is-us-is-forcing-chinesecompany-sell-gay-dating-app-grindr.
154

Id.
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discovered in Grindr’s software. 155 For instance, Grindr was
chastised for a flaw in its security that leaked the geolocations
data of users—the very data that made the application successful
in the first place. 156
It is important to note that CFIUS did not investigate
Kunlun’s initial acquisition of sixty percent of Grindr in 2016. 157
CFIUS likely did not investigate the initial transaction in 2016
because it did not have the power to do so under FINSA. CFIUS
also did not immediately investigate Kunlan’s purchase of the
remaining forty percent stake in Grindr in 2018 for similar
reasons. Nevertheless, Kunlun’s fortune of evading CFIUS
review changed in March of 2019, when CFIUS exercised its
expanded jurisdiction under FIRRMA, launching an ex-post
investigation in the Grindr acquisition, which ultimately resulted
in the forced divestment of Kunlun’s interest in Grindr. 158 CFIUS
did not comment publicly regarding the national security risks
that this same-sex dating app posed.159 Many national security
commentors theorize that CFIUS was concerned with Kunlun’s
unfettered access to Grindr users’ sensitive data. 160 Specific types
of data that CFIUS was likely concerned with included
geolocation data, sexual preferences, HIV status, and private
messages exchanged between users.161
But even if CFIUS was concerned with Kunlun’s access to
Grindr’s user information, that does not explain the threat to
national security uncovered by CFIUS in its investigation. For
many Grindr users, access to their information poses absolutely
no threat to national security. On the other hand, for a minority
of Grindr users, Kunlan’s access to sensitive user data could pose
155
James Cook, Security Flaw in Gay Dating App Grindr Reveals Precise
Location of 90% of Users, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:10 AM),

https://www.businessinsider.com/exploit-reveals-location-of-grindr-users-2014-8.
156

Id.

Danzman & Gertz, supra note 153.
Carl O’Donnell, Liana B. Baker & Echo Wang, Exclusive: Told U.S. Security
at Risk, Chinese Firm Seeks to Sell Grindr Dating App, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019,
1:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-exclusive/exclusive-u-spushes-chinese-owner-of-grindr-to-divest-the-dating-app-sourcesidUSKCN1R809L.
157
158

159
160
161

Id.
Id.
Id.
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a national security threat. For example, certain intelligence
sources have reported that CFIUS’s “concern focused on the
potential for the blackmail of American officials or contractors, if
China threatened to disclose their sexual orientation, or track
their movements or dating habits.” 162
President Trump’s decision to divest Grindr seems to try to
solve a national security issue with a hatchet rather than a scalpel.
It is not entirely clear how the decision to divest Grindr passes
muster under the requirement that other “provisions of law . . .
[do not] provide adequate and appropriate authority for the
President to protect the national security.” 163 If President Trump
was truly concerned about the potential for foreign adversaries to
blackmail government employees and contractors, why did he
not just simply execute a narrow executive order preventing U.S.
government officials, military personnel, and contractors from
downloading Grindr on their personal mobile devices?
The Grindr divestment is an illustration of CFIUS’s
expanded jurisdiction to review foreign investments involving
U.S. businesses that collect and maintain user data, even after the
transactions have been closed and forgotten. Thus, FIRRMA
creates yet another transaction cost that foreign persons must
consider when investing in or acquiring a U.S. business that
collects and maintains user data—the potential for a deal to be
unwound in the future. While it is difficult to argue against laws
that improve and strengthen the national security of the United
States, foreign investors and U.S. businesses face undeniable
obstacles and high transaction costs due to CFIUS’s limited
transparency and accountability in relation to FIRRMA’s
expansion of the Committee’s jurisdiction.
2. The TikTok Debacle: Raising the Alarm on
CFIUS Misuse
While the Grindr case illustrates CFIUS’s expanded
jurisdiction to review transactions that involve U.S. businesses
162
David E. Sanger, Grindr Is Owned by a Chinese Firm, and the U.S. Is
Trying to Force It to Sell, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https:/www.nytimes.com/

2019/03/28/us/politics/grindr-china-national-security.html.
163 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(4).
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that collect and maintain user data, CFIUS’s investigation into
TikTok illustrates how the executive branch can weaponize
foreign investment regulation to achieve political goals unrelated
to national security.
In 2019, CFIUS initiated communications with TikTok
representatives to determine whether to review ByteDance’s
acquisition of Musical.ly. 164 In March of 2020, after several
months of evaluating whether it had jurisdiction over the
acquisition, “CFIUS advised TikTok that it intended to conduct a
formal review.” 165 Then, on June 15, 2020, CFIUS formally
began its review of the ByteDance-Musical.ly transaction. 166
During CFIUS’s lengthy review, TikTok claimed to have
provided “voluminous documentation and information in
response to CFIUS’s questions.” 167 Specifically, TikTok claimed
to have provided CFIUS with documentation “demonstrating
TikTok’s security measures to help ensure U.S. user data is
safeguarded in storage and in transit and cannot be accessed by
unauthorized persons—including any government—outside the
United States.” 168 While TikTok continued to comply with
CFIUS’s request for important company documentation, CFIUS
never articulated specific information about the nature of the
national security threat that TikTok posed or why TikTok’s
proposed mitigation plans were inadequate. 169 Additionally,
TikTok claims that CFIUS “terminated formal communications
. . . well before the conclusion of the initial statutory review
period.” 170
With time running out, TikTok received a letter from the
Committee, “stating that ‘CFIUS has identified national security
risks arising from the [Musical.ly acquisition] and that it has not
identified mitigation measures that would address those risks.’” 171
Consistent with CFIUS’s lack of communication with TikTok
Nicas, Isaac & Swanson, supra note 4.
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 13, TikTok Inc. v.
Trump, No. 2:20-cv-7672 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2020) [hereinafter TikTok Complaint].
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.

TikTok Complaint, supra note 165, at 15.
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during the investigation, the Committee did not provide TikTok
with its findings on the issue of national security. 172
Similar to CFIUS’s concerns with Grindr, the Committee’s
determination that TikTok posed a national security risk likely
resulted from TikTok’s well-documented history of cybersecurity
vulnerabilities associated with its platform. 173 In addition, many
officials believe that CFIUS was also concerned with China’s 2017
national intelligence law, which allows the Chinese government
“to gain access to any information held by a Chinese company
upon request.” 174 Therefore, if ByteDance’s operations in China
had access to American TikTok users’ data, then the Chinese
government could demand ByteDance to provide the “vast trove
of personal data collected by the app.” 175 But interestingly, some
CFIUS watchdogs have speculated that CFIUS was concerned
with ByteDance’s “joint venture with a Chinese state-owned
media group.” 176 Thus, CFIUS might have also feared TikTok’s
platform could be used to spread manipulative disinformation to
young voters, allowing China to influence the 2020 U.S. national
election in a manner similar to Russia’s attempt to manipulate
the 2016 U.S. national election. 177
CFIUS’s investigation into TikTok raised concerns among
private sector CFIUS attorneys because the Committee did not
follow the “normal” procedures for national security

TikTok Complaint, supra note 165, at 15.
Ronen Berman, Sheera Frenkel & Raymond Zhong, Major TikTok Security
Flaws Found, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/
technology/tiktok-security-flaws.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2020) (explaining the
vulnerabilities discovered in TikTok’s cybersecurity).
174
Benjamin Horney, TikTok is the Tip of the Iceberg for CFIUS’ Data
Concerns, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2020, 8:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1299395/tiktok-is-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-for-cfius-data-concerns.
172
173

175

Id.

David R. Hanke, TikTok National Security Problem: Don’t Ignore the
Lessons of 2016, THE HILL (Jan. 28, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/
176

cybersecurity/480251-the-tiktok-national-security-problem-dont-ignore-the-lessonsof-2016.
177
See id. (drawing parallels between the use of TikTok to influence voters to
the Russian intelligence’s alleged use of Twitter and Facebook to influence the 2016
U.S. national election); see also Salil K. Mehra, Algorithmic Competition, Trade
and Investment: The CFIUS as Privacy Regulator, 16 UNIV. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 8, 22
(2020).

LIST (DO NOT DELETE)

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

204

3/1/2022 9:14 AM

[Vol. 46:1

investigations.178 The most concerning aspect of FIRRMA’s
jurisdictional expansion, which became clear from its
investigation into TikTok, is that CFIUS can review any
corporate acquisition on the basis that the acquired company
satisfies the threshold number of one million U.S. users. 179 Thus,
similar investigations into Chinese acquisitions of U.S. firms that
collect user data are likely to continue and may become more
frequent because data collection has become the norm for many
corporations.180 Without measures in place to prevent CFIUS
from targeted investigations, the executive branch can take
advantage of the corporate practice of collecting user data to
launch CFIUS investigations that further a sitting President’s
policies and agenda. 181
V.

STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Congress has amended CFIUS’s review jurisdiction four
times since the Committee was created by executive order in
1975. 182
Each amendment reflects congressional intent to
modernize and strengthen CFIUS and to ensure that the foreign
investment activity of adversaries will not threaten U.S. national
security. FIRRMA represents Congress’ most recent attempt to
modernize and strengthen CFIUS’s National Security Review
powers.183 While FIRRMA equips CFIUS with the tools to meet
today’s national security concerns, Congress has failed to provide
both sufficient measures to hold CFIUS and the executive branch
accountable for misusing foreign investment regulations to
advance political objectives as well as mechanisms of
transparency for parties conducting foreign transactions that
ensure investor confidence in the review process. The Grindr
and TikTok cases are recent examples of the secrecy that cloaks
178
See Birnbaum, supra note 141 (quoting Derek Scissors, a resident scholar
with the conservative American Enterprise Institute, who commented that
Microsoft’s involvement was “not normal.”).
179 31 C.F.R. § 800.241(a)(1)(i)(A)–(C).
180
See Birnbaum, supra note 141 (expressing the concerns of private sector
attorneys).
181 See Birnbaum, supra note 141.
182 See discussion supra Part II–III.
183 See discussion supra Part III.
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CFIUS’s review process. 184 Both cases have made clear that
CFIUS fails to give foreign investors the transparency and
certainty
necessary
to
conduct
proper
international
185
transactions.
Not only has CFIUS’s recent actions left
technology companies like Grindr and TikTok in the dark
regarding the specific national security risks posed by their
platforms, but CFIUS’s recent politization in the media and the
inability for the other branches of government to adequately
check CFIUS’s power has caused the Committee to lose
legitimacy in the eyes of foreign investors.186
To address CFIUS’s transparency and accountability issues,
and to restore its legitimacy, this comment proposes that
Congress should amend FIRRMA in three ways. First, Congress
should decrease executive discretion by providing a more specific
definition of national security through bright line factors that the
President must evaluate when determining whether a transaction
poses a national security threat. Second, Congress should
strengthen congressional oversight by establishing a jointcongressional committee and by increasing the frequency of
CFIUS’s reporting requirements.
Lastly, Congress should
establish a special Article III court, the Foreign Investment
Court, that will allow parties to bring claims against improper
CFIUS investigations while preserving strict confidentiality of
sensitive business information and executive discretion over
issues of national security. This comment also argues that the
proposed amendments must be made together, because each
proposed amendment by itself will not prevent CFIUS from
politicization or provide foreign investors with the transparency
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1–2.
See Justin Shields, Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign Investment
Regulation, National Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 51 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 293–94 (2018) (noting foreign investor’s
184
185

frustration with CFIUS’s lack of transparency).
186
Benjamin Horney, 3 Lingering Questions About Oracle’s Deal With
TikTok, LAW360 (Sep. 21, 2020,), https://www.law360.com/articles/1312013/3lingering-questions-about-oracle-s-deal-with-tiktok; see also Kate O’Keeffe, Trump
Orders Broadcom to Cease Attempt to Buy Qualcomm, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-letter-cfius-suggests-it-may-soon-recommendagainst-broadcom-bid-for-qualcomm-1520869867 (highlighting private sector
attorney’s concerns that CFIUS review of Qualcomm was inconsistent with
congressional intent).
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and accountability necessary to conduct international business
with confidence.
A. Congressional Claw Back of CFIUS Discretion
1. Defining National Security by Decreasing the
President’s Discretion
In reality, most foreign investments are innocuous. Yet, due
to FIRRMA’s broad definition of national security, CFIUS has
discretion to investigate, moderate mitigation negotiations, and
provide the President with terminating recommendations, all of
which are subject to abuse. While broad discretion allows CFIUS
to achieve its purpose of protecting national security, it also gives
the President carte blanche to execute the White House’s
economic and political policies.
To begin, substituting more exacting, bright line standards
for FIRRMA’s broad language would limit the potential for
CFIUS’s powers to be misused. Specifically, Congress should
amend FIRRMA’s language to cabin the definition of “national
security” by tightening the factors that the President and CFIUS
may consider when determining whether a transaction poses a
threat to national security. These factors should also recognize
that user data is an integral part of many commercial ventures,
and that while valuable, user data rarely raises significant
national security concerns.
FIRRMA defines the term “national security” as risks that
“include those issues relating to ‘homeland security,’ including its
application to critical infrastructure.” 187 There are strong policy
justifications for defining national security broadly.
First,
national security threats are hard to pinpoint and are ever
changing. Second, a broad definition prevents CFIUS and the
President from being pigeonholed into responding to
particularized national security threats. Third, allowing CFIUS
and the President to have discretion in matters of national
security allows for prompt and swift action when threats are
identified.
While there are strong policy justifications against limiting
187

50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(1).
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the definition of national security, Congress should amend the
national security factors under FIRRMA to recognize the
importance of user data in modern commercial ventures. The
eleven national security factors that CFIUS consults seem to focus
primarily on transactions related to American military defense
technology, and energy and mineral resource security, as well as
the economic, military, and political relationships between the
United States and the foreign countries. 188 Consequently, the
only factor that can logically relate to user data concerns is the
eleventh factor: “such other factors as the President or the
Committee may determine to be appropriate.” 189 This eleventh
factor is the carte blanche that gives unlimited discretion to the
President and CFIUS to determine what may be an “appropriate”
threat to national security. 190 Giving the executive branch such a
broad mandate has the drawback of creating unpredictable
standards for foreign investors. To provide foreign investors
with confidence, this eleventh factor needs to be constrained to
reflect CFIUS’s narrow focus “to review transactions for the
purpose of protecting national security” and not to advance
political ideology. 191 Therefore, the eleventh factor should be
removed. As a result, the President and CFIUS would be
constrained to evaluate transactions that fall under the penumbra
of national security created by the remaining ten factors. This
will correctly balance the national security concerns that
Congress intended CFIUS to investigate with the interests of
foreign investment in technology and data driven companies that
are vital to the American economy.192

188
189
190
191

See id. at § 4565(f)(1)–(11).
Id. at § 4565(f)(11).
Id.
See id. at § 4565(f)(1)–(11).

192
It is important to note that the eleven “factors to be considered” by the
President when determining whether a transaction poses a national security risk
have not been updated since FINSA was signed into law in 2007. Compare Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 4, 121 Stat.
246, 253–54, with 50 U.S.C. § 4565(f)(1)–(11). Therefore, the eleven national
security factors were formulated before the smartphone revolution took off, which
fostered the market for mobile applications like Grindr and TikTok.
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2. Increasing Communications Between CFIUS and
Congress
While narrowing the definition of national security can make
navigating CFIUS’s complex review process slightly simpler for
foreign investors, it does not completely address CFIUS’s
accountability and transparency issues. To protect CFIUS from
political abuse, Congress should further amend FIRRMA to
increase congressional oversight. Congress should increase its
oversight capabilities by creating a specialized joint-congressional
committee and increasing CFIUS’s reporting requirements.
Reporting requirements ensure congressional engagement
in the CFIUS review process. Reporting requirements also keep
Congress up-to-date on foreign investment trends, the volume of
CFIUS reviews being conducted, and the pros and cons of
CFIUS’s review procedures. In theory, the proposed amendment
to increase Congress’ oversight of CFIUS will force CFIUS to
disclose more information about how CFIUS conducts
investigations. This, in turn, would benefit the public by giving
foreign investors confidence that Congress will discover arbitrary
and politically motivated national security determinations and
hold CFIUS accountable. 193
Although strengthening congressional oversight may
provide the benefits of accountability and transparency, at the
same time, increasing communications between CFIUS and
Congress poses many drawbacks. First, increasing reporting
requirements to Congress runs the risk of compromising the
confidentiality of sensitive business information. While CFIUS
prides itself on strict observance of statutory confidentiality
requirements, Congress is not necessarily bound by such strict
provisions.194
The second risk associated with increasing
congressional involvement is that it can have the adverse effect of
politicizing CFIUS even further. It is important to note that
increasing Congress’ involvement in the foreign transaction
Robert N. Cappucci, Amending the Treatment of Defense Production
Enterprises Under the U.S. Exon-Florio Provision: A Move Toward Protectionism
or Globalism?, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 652, 667–68 (1993) (arguing that
193

congressional oversight makes it difficult for the President and CFIUS to arbitrarily
block or suspend foreign investments).
194 Stagg, supra note 79, at 329.
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review process will not necessarily insulate the CFIUS from
politization. Private interest groups have strong influence on
congressional decisions, which can lead to the “potential of
political mischief.” 195 As elected officials, members of Congress
are held accountable by the voters, and therefore, may be
influenced by their constituents’ opinions, as well as the opinions
of private interest groups that help fund congressional election
campaigns. Interest groups lobby specific issues and work the
legislature to achieve self-interested goals. 196 Thus, Congress is
likely to receive information from interest groups that is both
biased and inaccurate in order to advance specific, individualized
agendas. 197 Allowing Congress more influence and involvement
in the CFIUS review process may encourage private interest
groups to increase pressure on Congress for the purpose of
achieving a competitive advantage in the marketplace, rather
than pressuring Congress to use oversight to ensure CFIUS is
held accountable for taking action unrelated to national security
concerns.
Nonetheless, the present level of congressional involvement
in CFIUS is inadequate to check the executive branch’s almost
unlimited discretion in foreign investment regulation. In order
for increased congressional oversight to be effective, the first step
would be to ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive
information businesses disclosed to CFIUS and the
determinations CFIUS makes based on that information. Thus,
to ensure confidentiality, Congress should establish a jointcongressional committee and restrict CFIUS’s reporting
requirements to only the members on the joint-congressional
committee. Joint-congressional committee members would have
195
Stagg, supra note 79, at 329 (arguing that heightened congressional
involvement in CFIUS’s review process “will encourage the politicization of [foreign
investment] transactions and discourage investment in the United States by
threatening to compromise corporate confidentiality”).
196
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 172 (1984)
(indicating that members of Congress are vulnerable to the “particularistic” views of
interest groups).
197
See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight:
Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 230 (1995)
(stating that members of Congress are generally aware that interest groups have
incentives to present one-sided facts to obtain favorable policies).

LIST (DO NOT DELETE)

210

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

3/1/2022 9:14 AM

[Vol. 46:1

backgrounds in pertinent areas, such as national security, foreign
investment, critical infrastructure, critical technologies, and data
privacy.198 The members of the proposed joint-congressional
committee would not have access to the intricate details and
documents that businesses provide to CFIUS, but instead would
have access to CFIUS’s investigative procedures and national
security determinations.
With a joint-congressional committee in place to ensure
confidentiality, the next step would be to increase the number of
mandated reports CFIUS would provide to the proposed
committee. Under FIRRMA’s current language, CFIUS is only
required to provide Congress with a single report “on all of the
reviews and investigations of covered transactions completed . . .
during the 12-month period covered by the report.” 199 Congress
should increase its oversight capabilities by amending FIRRMA
to mandate that CFIUS provide, in addition to annual report
Congress, a quarterly report to the proposed joint-congressional
committee “on all of the reviews and investigations of covered
transactions completed . . . during each 3-month period.”
Requiring CFIUS to provide the proposed jointcongressional committee with a report every three months is
ideal because it is approximately the same amount of time CFIUS
takes to conduct its foreign investment review on average. 200
Thus, requiring CFIUS to provide the proposed jointcongressional committee with a report every three months would
allow CFIUS to complete its review of covered transactions that
occur each calendar quarter and provide legislatures with its
findings and determinations.
Additionally, increased reporting requirements will deter
improper CFIUS review. Instead of having to report to Congress
once a year, reporting to the proposed joint-congressional
See generally CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42106, SECRET
SESSIONS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE: AUTHORITY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND FREQUENCY
(2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42106.pdf.
199 50 U.S.C. § 4565(m)(1).
200
John Lash & Natasha Moore, The Invisible Risks of CFIUS: Timing and
Uncertainty, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2020/
08/27/the-invisible-risks-of-cfius-timing-and-uncertainty/?sh=612d5d8576b8
(claiming the average time from the beginning of CFIUS investigation to closing a
deal was eighty-five days calendar days in 2019).
198
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committee four times a year decreases CFIUS’s ability to avoid
congressional critique. Therefore, increasing Congress’ oversight
of CFIUS ensures that arbitrary investigations and actions taken
by the executive branch are questioned in a timely manner rather
than at the end of the calendar year.
A drawback of providing the proposed joint-congressional
committee with reports every three months is that it will increase
CFIUS’s workload, with the potential to cause further delays to
an already densely packed docket. Nevertheless, such a tradeoff
will promote accountability and transparency necessary to check
CFIUS’s abuse of expanded foreign investment review powers
and will provide select members of Congress with important
information on how the executive branch uses CFIUS. Congress
can then use the information gathered each quarter to further
amend CFIUS, making the Committee more efficient and less
capable of politization. If an increased workload truly strains
CFIUS’s resources, Congress can always appropriate more funds
to CFIUS or CFIUS could pass the cost of hiring more regulators
to the transacting parties through increased filing fees.201
Another justification for the proposed increased oversight is
that it will complement FIRRMA’s mitigation policies. Under
FIRRMA, CFIUS “may . . . negotiate, enter into or impose, and
enforce any agreement or condition with any party . . . in order
to mitigate any risk of the national security of the United
States.” 202 Turning to the TikTok case, TikTok claims to have
entered into mitigation negotiations with CFIUS and to have
proposed an “extraordinary” plan that addressed all conceivable
national security concerns. 203 Yet, according to TikTok, CFIUS
and the President never countered or commented on TikTok’s
mitigation proposals. 204
Whether or not the facts presented in TikTok’s complaint
are accurate, the situation poses an alarming hypothetical where
CFIUS and the President can force the divesture of a foreign
201
50 U.S.C. § 4565(p)(2) (appropriating $20,000,000 per year to CFIUS for
fiscal years 2019–23); see 50 U.S.C. § 4565(p)(3) (authorizing CFIUS to impose
reasonable filing fees).
202 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(3)(A)(i).
203 TikTok Complaint, supra note 165, at 25.
204 See TikTok Complaint, supra note 165, at 25.

LIST (DO NOT DELETE)

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

212

3/1/2022 9:14 AM

[Vol. 46:1

company even when mitigation proposals successfully address all
material national security concerns. 205 An additional concern is
that even when a foreign company mitigates all conceivable
national security concerns, CFIUS and the President’s decision to
move forward with a forced divestment is not subject to judicial
review. 206 Thus, the mitigating party will never truly know
whether they adequately addressed national security concerns or
whether CFIUS and President acted arbitrarily for political
gain. 207
B. Establishing the Foreign Investment Court
In general, the judiciary is not involved in matters of
national security. 208 There are strong policy justifications for
keeping national security issues away from the courts. First,
Article III courts do not have access to the same intelligence
information as the Commander-in-Chief.209 Second, unlike the
Article III judges who are constitutionally guaranteed life tenure,
the President is subject to the political process and can be
punished at the polls for making national security decisions that
voters disagree with. 210
The separation of powers doctrine also makes the standard
Article III court an improper venue for determining national
security issues. Article III judges afford great deference to the
executive branch on matters of national security because the
Constitution expressly allocates such power to the executive
branch. 211 Deference to executive branch decisions on national
security stems from the President’s inherent and plenary Article
205
206

See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(3).
See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(1) (“[t]he actions of the President . . . shall not be

subject to judicial review.”).
207 See id. at § 4565(d)(1); see also Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the
U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the President’s decision to
block a transaction is not reviewable).
208 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevroning Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L. J. 1170, 1207–08 (2007) (arguing that courts should defer to the President’s
national security judgment).
209 Id. at 1207.
210

Id.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 137–48 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that courts notoriously raise
the political question doctrine to avoid hearing foreign affairs cases).
211
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II powers and the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers. 212
While the judiciary notoriously defers to the President’s actions in
regards to national security, the Supreme Court has made clear
that the President’s powers do not necessarily allow the executive
branch to make unilateral decisions on the nation’s economic
affairs. 213 As a result, the Court has been more willing to
scrutinize a President’s national security determination that
invades the powers granted to other branches of government by
the Constitution. 214
With this in mind, FIRRMA subjects CFIUS to limited
judicial review. 215 Under FIRRMA, actions or findings by CFIUS
are subject to judicial review in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 216 FIRRMA, however,
exempts from judicial review any action taken by the President
after CFIUS’s referral. 217 As a result, FIRRMA’s judicial review
provision is likely illusory. To illustrate, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s ruling in Ralls Corp. v.
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 218 makes
clear that involving the judiciary in CFIUS matters carries very
little bite.
Ralls Corp. remains the only judicial challenge brought
against CFIUS. In Ralls Corp., a Chinese-owned Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia,
purchased four American LLCs that were in the windfarm
development business in north-central Oregon (Ralls). 219
Although the transaction was between businesses incorporated in
the United States, in June 2012, CFIUS initiated a National
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642–43 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
214
See id.; see also O’Keeffe, supra note 186 (noting that many corporate
attorneys belied that CFIUS had overstepped its jurisdiction by blocking Broadcom
and Qualcomm merger).
215
See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2) (providing United States Courts of Appeals for
District of Columbia Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over civil action brought
against CFIUS).
212
213

216
217
218

2014).
219

Id.
See id. § 4565(e)(1).

Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir.

Id. at 304.
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Security Review of Ralls acquisition of the Oregon windfarms
because of their location near and within Navy airspace. 220
During the initial thirty-day review, Ralls complied with CFIUS’s
requests and even gave a presentation to CFIUS officials on its
operations. 221 Consistent with its theme of secrecy, however,
CFIUS never “disclosed the information it reviewed.” 222
At the end of the thirty-day National Security Review, CFIUS
concluded that Ralls’ acquisition of the Oregon windfarms posed
a national security threat and ordered Ralls to cease construction
and to prevent all employees from accessing the windfarm sites. 223
After prescribing the orders, CFIUS then initiated a forty-fiveday National Security Investigation.224 Within three days of
launching the National Security Investigation, CFIUS issued
additional orders to Ralls, prohibiting the company “from
completing any sale of the [windfarms] without first removing all
items (including concrete foundations) from the [project site in
Oregon].” 225 In addition, CFIUS ordered Ralls to notify the
Committee of any potential sale and that CFIUS retained the
right to object to said sale. 226 At the conclusion of its National
Security Investigation, CFIUS submitted its recommendations to
President Barack Obama, who ordered Ralls to divest its
ownership of the windfarms.227
Ralls promptly challenged CFIUS’s orders on due process
grounds, claiming that it had the right under the Fifth
Amendment to review and rebut the evidence CFIUS relied on in
making its determination that the acquisition was a threat to
national security. 228 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit made two
important rulings. First, the D.C. Circuit found that foreign
220
Id. at 305; see also Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 2(b)(1), 121 Stat. 246, 247 (exercising CFIUS’s thirty-day
National Security Review).
221
222
223

Id.
Id.
Id.

224 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 305 (D.C.
Cir. 2014); see also Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2(b)(2),
121 Stat. at 248 (exercising CFIUS’s forty-five-day National Security Investigation).
225
226
227
228

Id.
Id.
Id. at 305–06.
Id.
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investors were not precluded from bringing claims against CFIUS
even though the statutory text “precludes judicial review of
‘actions of the President.’” 229 Second, the D.C. Circuit ruled that
because Ralls had acquired property rights under Oregon law,
President Obama’s divestment order “deprived Ralls of its
constitutionally protected property interest [without due process
of law].” 230
Although the D.C. Circuit technically ruled in favor of the
Chinese investors, the court’s ruling was narrow. First, aggrieved
parties were precluded from judicial review except for
constitutional challenges to CFIUS procedures for failing to
provide due process of law. 231 Second, the D.C. Circuit held that
due process does not require CFIUS or the President to disclose
the reasoning for divestment. 232
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit
reiterated that “due process does not require disclosure of
classified information supporting official action.” 233 Thus, to
comply with due process, CFIUS and the President were only
required to disclose to Ralls the unclassified information that the
President relied upon in making the national security threat
determination, and to allow Ralls the opportunity to dispute the
unclassified information. 234 Without bright line laws limiting the
government’s ability to declare what is and what is not classified,
the D.C. Circuit’s holding is problematic for foreign investors like
Ralls Corp. because the government has discretion to mark all
documents as classified information. 235
With limited judicial review under FIRRMA and the D.C.
Circuit’s narrow holding in Ralls Corp., CFIUS has been able to
engage in unreasonable conduct under both the Obama and
Trump Administrations. 236 Although protecting national security
Id. at 310.
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
229

230

231
232
233

Id.
Id.
See id. (holding that the President’s decision to block a transaction is not

reviewable).
234 Id. at 319–20.
235
See Chang Liu, Note, Ralls v. CFIUS: The Long Time Coming Judicial

Protection of Foreign Investors’ Constitutional Rights Against Government’s
National Security Review, 15 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 361, 375 (2016).
236 See Covington & Burling LLP, President Obama Blocks Chinese Acquisition
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is an important function of the executive branch, national
security concerns can be invoked in bad faith because of the
presumption against judicial review. Both the Grindr and
TikTok cases make clear that there is a need for judicial review
over CFIUS proceedings. 237 Thus, with both the current version
of FIRRMA and the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Ralls Corp. as
precedent, injured parties are severely limited in seeking
remedies for CFIUS misuse, making FIRRMA’s grant of judicial
review effectively legislative window-dressing. 238
Introducing a strong judicial check to executive power will
encourage CFIUS to adhere to the rule of law and not the
pressures of the American political machine. CFIUS, acting as
mere cog in said machine, has been able to avoid judicial review
because of the judiciary’s highly deferential role in national
security matters. Thus, the issue is finding the correct balance on
the spectrum of judicial review, where full access to the courts is
located at one end and FIRRMA’s limited access to the courts at
the other, all while preserving the doctrine of separation of
powers.
The predicament of balancing judicial review and national
security is not novel; Congress addressed this issue in the
context of warrantless wiretaps when it passed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). 239 FISA established the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), an Article III
court with the exclusive power to authorize electronic surveillance
for national security purposes. 240 Congress’ intent in passing
of Aixtron SE, 2 (2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/

2016/12/president_obama_blocks_chinese_acquisition_of_aixtron_se.pdf (arguing
that the blocked Fujian-Aixtron transaction was an unusual use of CFIUS’s powers);
see also Paul Marquardt, TikTok: Familiar Issues, Unfamiliar Responses, CLEARLY
FOREIGN
INV.
&
INT’L
TRADE
WATCH
(Aug.
6,
2020),
https://www.clearytradewatch.com/2020/08/tiktok-familiar-issues-unfamiliarresponses (indicating that it was unprecedented to review the merger between two
foreign companies outside the United States).
237 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1–2.
238
See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 301
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
239
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c)).
240
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The

Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, 137 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 793, 794 (1989).
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FISA and establishing FISC was to better balance civil liberties
with the discretion afforded to the executive branch on matters of
national security. 241 FISC is a specialized court that is composed
of eleven district court judges who are appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. 242 When the government wants to
electronically survey an individual, it applies to FISC for a
warrant. 243
A FISC judge is then assigned to review the
government’s application for electronic surveillance and conducts
hearings on the application in a secure setting. 244 FISA includes a
list of standards that the assigned FISC judge must evaluate when
determining whether electronic surveillance is justified. 245 In the
case of an appeal, a denied application is reviewed by a threejudge panel of federal appellate court judges who have also been
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States. 246
Applying Congress’ logic in balancing national security and
civil liberties through the creation of FISC, Congress should
introduce a new Article III court—the Foreign Investment
Court—and model its structure after FISC. Similar to FISC, the
Foreign Investment Court would be composed of a number of
district court judges who would similarly be appointed by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 247 In creating the Foreign
Investment Court, Congress could prescribe specific factors that
the Chief Justice must consider when appointing federal district
court judges to the Foreign Investment Court. For example,
Congress could require the Chief Justice to appoint only district
court judges that have experience in pertinent areas, such as
national security law, foreign investment transactional law,
international law, critical infrastructure, critical technologies, and
U.S. businesses that collect and maintain personal data. 248 By
241

Id. at 811.

50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2020).
See id. at § 1804(a); see also United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 145
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (“To get such an order, a federal officer . . . must submit an
application to one of the seven USFISC judges.”).
244 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803–05.
245 Id. at § 1805.
246 Id. at § 1803(b).
247 See id. at § 1803(a)(1).
248
While finding district court judges with the proposed specialized
backgrounds may prove to be difficult, only a few judges with specialized
backgrounds would be necessary. From 2015 to 2019, transacting parties filed an
242
243
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limiting the Foreign Investment Court to federal judges with
specialized backgrounds, Congress would ensure the court’s
competency which, in turn, would yield immediate legitimacy.
The Foreign Investment Court would function similarly to
any other Article III court allowing both CFIUS and the parties
to the transaction to submit briefings, evidence, and oral
arguments. To ensure confidentiality, the Foreign Investment
Court’s proceedings would be conducted in a highly secured
setting, much like FISC, allowing for both the government to
disclose classified national intelligence and the aggrieved parties
to disclose sensitive business information. 249
Then, like a
traditional Article III court, the assigned judge would review the
evidence and conduct a fact-intensive inquiry.
Applying the proposed Foreign Investment Court’s
framework to the TikTok case would solve a number of issues.
First, a federal judge would evaluate the reasonableness of the
national security concerns uncovered by CFIUS in its review of
ByteDance’s acquisition of Musical.ly. As previously noted,
CFIUS did not provide TikTok with the specific details of what
was uncovered during its investigation. 250 Thus, permitting a
judge to review CFIUS’s specific concerns will allow the Foreign
Investment Court to determine whether it was reasonable for
CFIUS to conclude that TikTok’s platform posed a threat to
national security.
Additionally, the assigned judge would have access to the
proposed mitigation measures TikTok submitted to CFIUS. If
TikTok proposed mitigation measures that adequately addressed
CFIUS’s national security concerns, then the assigned judge
would rule in favor of TikTok, allowing the government and
TikTok to enter into a binding mitigation agreement. If TikTok
average of 118 cases with CFIUS, with approximately one case each year requiring
the President to make a decision. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANN.
REPORT TO CONG., 4 (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUSPublic-Annual-Report-CY-2019.pdf.
249
David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power,
and Constitutional Constraint, 75 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1357 (2008) (arguing
that courts can be trusted with classified information because data indicates that the
courts leaked less classified information than the executive branch post-9/11).
250 TikTok Complaint, supra note 165, at 25–26; see also discussion supra Part
IV.A.2.
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failed to propose mitigation measures that adequately addressed
CFIUS’s concerns, then the assigned judge would rule in favor of
CFIUS, allowing the Committee to submit recommendations to
the President, who can then take statutory action. Alternatively,
if TikTok’s proposed mitigation measures inadequately
addressed CFIUS’s national security concerns, the Foreign
Investment Court would provide a secure forum for the two sides
to negotiate a mitigation agreement in good faith that adequately
addresses the national security concerns raised by CFIUS. If the
two sides were to fail to come to an agreement, the assigned
judge could rule on a mitigation agreement that balances the
national security concerns of CFIUS with the business interests of
TikTok.
A strong justification for establishing the Foreign Investment
Court is that it would facilitate foreign investment in the United
States by increasing foreign investor confidence. Due to the
nature of national security intelligence and the sensitivity of
competitive business information that would be disclosed behind
the Foreign Investment Court’s closed doors, not all decisionmaking would be made available to the public. Similar to FISC,
however, Congress could prescribe the declassification of Foreign
Investment Court decisions, orders, and opinions “that include[]
a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of
law.” 251 The Foreign Investment Court will then create a positive
feedback loop for the foreign investment community—the
Foreign Investment Court will establish precedent, precedent in
turn increases predictability, predictability increases foreign
confidence in CFIUS, foreign confidence increases foreign
investment activity in U.S. businesses, and increased foreign
investment activity in U.S. businesses will inevitably create more
Foreign Investment Court precedent. 252

50 U.S.C. § 1872.
Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012) (illustrating that precedent increases the
predictability of legal outcomes).
251
252
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CONCLUSION

This comment advances two arguments. First, this comment
demonstrates that FIRRMA lacks adequate congressional and
judicial checks and balances necessary to deter executive abuse of
CFIUS’s review powers. As a result of FIRRMA’s expansion of
CFIUS’s jurisdiction, the executive branch has been granted
impermissible discretion to review foreign transactions,
subjecting an important interagency committee tasked with
protecting the country from national security threats to the
turbulence of American politics. In turn, FIRRMA allowed
former President Trump to weaponize CFIUS to advance
isolationist polices under the guise of national security and will
continue to allow sitting Presidents to act similarly.
Second, this comment argues the need to amend FIRRMA so
that the foreign investment review power is properly distributed
between the three branches of government. To shift power away
from CFIUS and the President, FIRRMA should be amended to
narrow the definition of national security in manner that
recognizes the importance of personally identifiable data in
today’s digital society. To shift power back to the legislature,
provisions should be added to FIRRMA that establish a jointcongressional committee and increase congressional oversite
requirements. Lastly, Congress should expressly grant judicial
review for aggrieved parties through the creation of the proposed
Foreign Investment Court to ensure investor confidence in
American foreign investment regulation. By reeling in foreign
investment review power from the executive branch and
distributing it among the legislative and judicial branches of
government, the opportunity for CFIUS to become politicized
will be greatly diminished with the benefit of providing
transparency and certainty to foreign investors.

